Frédéric Encel: “Al-Joulani has not become ‘moderate,’ but he has every reason to act pragmatically and cautiously”

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Syria post-Assad

Frédéric Encel: “Al-Joulani has not become ‘moderate,’ but he has every reason to act pragmatically and cautiously”

10 December 2024 Interviews 306

Geopolitician and essayist Frédéric Encel analyzes the repercussions of the new shockwave shaking the Middle East after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria and the rise to power of an Islamist coalition led by Abu Mohammed al-Joulani, a former figure of ISIS and al-Qaeda.

By Nicolas Chene

– How do you explain the rapid turn of events leading to the fall of Assad’s regime?

– Assad’s regime collapse can be explained in two ways, as I see it: one internal and the other external. Internally, the regime’s army is utterly exhausted, having lost an enormous number of soldiers during thirteen years of civil war. The backbone of this army is the Alawites, Assad’s community. Today, nearly a third of Alawite males have been killed or wounded in combat since 2011, which has played a significant role.

Externally, the regime has lacked reliable allies. Hezbollah, Iran, and Russia remained supporters of the Syrian regime, but they have been ineffective. Israel has put heavy pressure on Hezbollah in recent weeks. Notably, the swift advance of the Islamist coalition on Damascus coincided with the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. Consequently, Iran no longer has a geographical corridor to directly support Hezbollah, as Syria was the linchpin of this route.

As for Russia, its impotence has been striking. What was, three years ago, considered the world’s second-largest army, has faced severe challenges, as evidenced by its struggles in Ukraine over the past two and a half years. It has been unable to back a crucial ally, its only foothold in the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern sphere since 1959. Assad’s regime lost all its allies, sealing its downfall.

I do not believe al-Joulani has become more moderate. There are no moderate Islamists. But I do think he and his forces will act with pragmatism and caution.

– What is the likely trajectory of post-Assad Syria?

– The new coalition in power holds very weak cards. While they quickly dismantled Assad’s regime, their internal assets are quite limited. Various communities, including the Alawites, Christians, Druze, and especially the Kurds, are watching closely to see how the coalition will behave. The northeastern region, part of Kurdistan, is still entirely outside the coalition’s control, and militarily, the coalition is relatively weak.

Another challenge lies in their relations with the West. Will al-Joulani be as dogmatic as his predecessors from al-Qaeda and ISIS? Will he immediately pursue a global or even regional jihad agenda, risking alienating the international community and provoking airstrikes from Western powers—the same forces that dismantled ISIS’s proto-state?

I don’t believe al-Joulani has become “moderate.” There are no moderate Islamists. But I do think he and his men will act with a great deal of pragmatism and caution for several reasons: they know they owe much—if not everything—to Turkey; they understand the dangers of approaching the Israeli border; and they control only a fraction of Syrian territory.

Erdogan is the godfather of the coalition that overthrew Assad’s regime. Idlib, the rebel stronghold, borders Türkiye. Without Türkiye’s leniency—or even active complicity on military and economic fronts—the jihadists could never have formed a victorious coalition.

– You mentioned Türkiye’s role in supporting al-Joulani and his forces. What are Erdogan’s intentions in post-Assad Syria?

– President Erdogan is nothing if not duplicitous. Türkiye’s support played a decisive role in the rapid attack that toppled Assad. Idlib, the rebel stronghold, is on the Turkish border. Without Türkiye’s military and economic complicity—or at least its leniency—the jihadists could never have assembled a victorious coalition. This is a certainty.

For years, Erdogan has aimed to repatriate 2 to 3 million Syrian refugees who fled to Turkey at the start of the conflict. The refugee issue has been used by Turkey as a pretext to justify its occupation of northern Syria, which, under international law, constitutes a formal occupation.

In post-Assad Syria, Erdogan appears as the primary victor, serving as the godfather of the coalition that overthrew the regime.

– What will al-Joulani’s rise to power mean for Israel?

– To me, Israel is the other major winner. The rebels’ rise to power and Assad’s fall are direct results of Israel’s victory over Hezbollah and Iran. Without Israel’s decisive actions against Hezbollah—and, by extension, Iran—the rebel coalition could not have triumphed so swiftly, as Hezbollah would have at once come to Assad’s aid, as it had in the 2010s.

The question is still whether this Islamist coalition, whose military capabilities are currently patchy and improvised, could pose a future threat to Israel.

BioExpress

Frédéric Encel, 55, holds a doctorate in geopolitics and is a professor of international relations and political science at the Paris School of Business. Winner of the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques award, he has authored 17 essays. His latest book, Les voies de la puissance (Odile Jacob, 2022; paperback 2023), explores the dynamics of power.