A group of researchers from the Emirati Trends Research & Advisory center, the University of Montreal and ”Pluriel”, the university research platform on Islam based in Lyon, have been collaborating since 2021 to produce the first academic index capable of measure the global influence of the Muslim Brotherhood. They have just released their first report covering the period 2022/2023. Exclusive extracts.

A debate has been ongoing among researchers for years now about Muslim Brotherhood’s International Organization (IO) and its roles and characteristics, as IO incarnates one of the most important manifestations of MB’s power and cohesion. In fact, IO represents the Muslim Brotherhood’s global organizational and political umbrella, comprising Egypt’s MB and its various branches around the world. The prominent role of IO lies in emphasizing MB’s influence on the international stage by building a network of relations with organizations and countries to enhance the group’s external position, and spread its worldview and ideological project, especially within Western societies.

From the first day of its establishment, IO sought to confer MB a religious legitimacy and export the idea that it is the defender of the Muslim Ummah1; first, through the establishment of unofficial transnational religious organizations, such as the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS), founded in 2004 by Yusuf al-Qaradawi, initially an MB member. Due to IO’s role in supporting MB’s global influence, improving their external image, defending their interests and ideological orientations and advancing their expansion efforts, MB usually choose a group of IO leaders who possess great management experiences and broad international relations. These leaders must have the skills to engage the outside world and the international public opinion; to deal with intelligence agencies and to strengthen partnership with international CSOs. Such leaders include Youssef Nada, known as MB’s international political foreign emissary.

The International Organization is of central importance to the Muslim Brotherhood, not only because it constitutes MB’s external arm, but also because it is one of their main sources of funding. In addition, it manages MB’s financial and business networks abroad. It is equipped with several media apparatuses in European countries to facilitate the expansion of MB influence worldwide in order to further MB’s goals and political project. The idea of establishing IO stemmed from MB’s quest for what is known as the “Mastery of the World” [ustâdhiyyat al-‘âlam]. Through IO, MB also put emphasis on the claims of “Reviving the Muslim Caliphate” and the “Universality of the Call.”2

Hence, IO’s power indicator is, in fact, an indicator of MB’s power itself and their current position on both the international and regional stages. As a matter of fact, there is a direct relationship between IO power and MB power, in the sense that as long as IO is coherent and robust, moving as a solid and harmonious unit, MB’s local branches will enjoy power and cohesion as well. This obliges us to examine and analyze IO power indicator, as well as its different elements, to assess accurately MB status.

Below, we will address IO’s main indicator and its sub-indicators that will allow us to measure its real power. We will then present and analyze the results obtained from monitoring the power of IO’s sub-indicators.

I.          Defining IO power’s main indicator, sub-indicators and weight by importance

1.          Defining the main indicator

IO aims primarily to create interconnectedness between the various MB groups all over the world; coordinate their positions in regard to ongoing issues and mobilize them to achieve MB’s strategic goals and influence public opinion and decision-makers, especially in the key regions for the group.

By IO power, we mean the force of its cohesion, legitimacy, and acceptance by societies, in addition to aspects of support offered by groups that sympathize with MB’s ideas and orientations. Studying these elements allows us to understand MB’s capabilities and influence at the international level and ascertain the forms of external support IO offers to the local MB branches. Furthermore, by defining IO power indicator, we mean to highlight the effectiveness of its decisions to guide the different MB branches, all over the world.

2.          Defining the sub-indicators

The sub-indicators are a set of indicators that measure IO power. They consist of five sub-indicators. At the top of these indicators is Legitimacy which refers to the extent to which IO is allowed to exercise its activities by a state, whether IO is recognized or regulated by the authorities, and the scope of freedom accorded to IO to operate by the State’s laws. It also refers to the freedom of movement IO enjoys (residence, visits, meetings, permanent presence, etc.)

The second sub-indicator is Cohesion and Control over Affiliates. This refers to the extent to which IO is able (or not) to direct and lead MB branches and organizational structure, allowing it to exercise this role without internal disputes or divisions. In other words, the extent to which local branches are committed to the decisions taken by the central IO, and the obligations imposed on them by IO.

The third sub-indicator is Acceptance within Society. It refers to the extent to which members of society and intermediary organizations, such as professional and labor syndicates, media organizations, CSOs and NGOs, political parties, etc. tolerate the existence of IO and its activities. The indicator tackles the degree to which these entities agree to deal with IO as well, either in co-organizing cultural, community and political events or taking part in IO-sponsored events.

The fourth sub-indicator is Structure, Composition and Centralization of Decision-Making. It indicates how centralization and flexibility impact decision-making within IO and how effective IO structure is in enforcing decisions.

The last sub-indicator is Supporting Lobby. This refers to the paid or unpaid lobbying groups that support IO goals. In this context, a lobby can be a civil society organization, a think tank, a political party, a media outlet, or a group of individuals who all mobilize for IO and defend its interests at the international level.

3.          Weights and relative importance

The weight of our IO Power main indicator represents 20% of the overall MBIPI. IO power has also been measured through sub-indicators of different weights.

As for the Legitimacy sub-indicator, it is ranked at the top by 37.5% in terms of its impact on IO power. In terms of degree of importance, it is defined as Very Important. Clearly, without legitimacy, IO would not be able to move or provide any kind of support to local MB branches or to establish affiliates. Without legitimacy, IO would face security-based prosecutions as well.

Two sub-indicators came in second in terms of weight and importance: Cohesion and Control over Affiliates, and Structure, Composition and Centralization of Decision-Making, comprising a weight of 25% for each. In terms of degree of importance, they are both assigned as Important, given that these two indicators demonstrate the extent to which IO is institutionalized, and its ability to maintain itself and respond to the challenges it faces internally and externally. It follows then, that both indicators reflect the extent to which IO is able to respond to external or internal variables related to loyalty and obedience, and as well, those subsequently resulting from elections or changes within IO itself.

In third place are the sub-indicators of Supporting Lobby and Acceptance within Society, with a weight of 12.5% for each. In terms of degree of importance, they are both labeled as Somewhat Important. As a matter of fact, without legitimacy, cohesion and a clear organizational structure, there would be no supporting lobbies or societal acceptance for IO.

For further details on how indicator weight and importance is calculated, refer to Chapter I of this report.

II.        Presenting and analyzing indicators’ quantitative results

As per Figure 1, it appears that the sub-indicator of Structure, Composition and Centralization of Decision-Making ranks first in affecting IO power main indicator by 40%. The Supporting Lobby sub-indicator came in second by 35%, while Legitimacy came in third place by 30.5%. Finally, the Acceptance within Society sub-indicator occupied the last place by 20%.

IO power indicator

In general, IO’s average power indicator shows diminishing power in 2022, given that the indicator’s contribution to MB’s total power is only 4.7%, even though IO represents MB’s international facade that is expected to be more effective and powerful. As shown by MBIPI results, this is due to MB’s deteriorating organizational situation, resulting from sharp internal divisions. The decline in funding sources, caused by restrictions on IO’s financial activities in several regions of the world, has also exacerbated IO’s deteriorating conditions, in addition to IO’s inability to duly manage and control MB branches. This decrease also reflects the fear expressed by many countries vis-à-vis IO, in light of the recently uncovered and widely publicized hidden cross-border MB agenda which present national security threats to states.

1.          Legitimacy

The Legitimacy sub-indicator comes in third place among the sub-indicators within the IO power main indicator. This sub-indicator contributed 30% to the main indicator. This reduced impact results from recently raised concerns in some European countries – such as France, Austria, and Germany – because IO is an invisible and undefined entity in addition to being a transnational religious ideology which does not recognize the nation-state. Moreover, IO uses and exploits some populist slogans, deploys provocative and disruptive tactics, and takes advantage of sensitive topics to influence the media, which in turn influences public opinion. As a response, restrictions have been imposed on it, without amounting to a complete ban3. Nevertheless, IO leadership is still seeking to strengthen its international stature by exporting the idea that it incarnates the dynamic face of the Muslim Brotherhood and translates its positions and vision, strengthening MB’s position within the various countries where it operates. From this point of view, IO works hard to consolidate this legitimacy, albeit by exporting a fictitious image of its power and control over MB affairs. Furthermore, many countries had adopted a lenient attitude towards IO, and essentially let it operate on the ground without any formal authorization. This was especially the case with Western countries, where IO seeks to infiltrate and monopolize the voice of Muslims and subsume it on various political occasions, as shown by a study of the European Centre for Counterterrorism and Secret Intelligence Studies. According to this study, in France alone there are more than 250 Islamic associations spread across the country, 51 of which work for the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, these religious charities engage in political activity in parallel with their religious and cultural activity4.

The German magazine Tichys Einblick5 also monitored how MB have penetrated the European Union. According to the magazine, the EU supports many of the causes and events sponsored by MB or hosted by MB-affiliated Islamic organizations in Brussels and Strasbourg, indicating clearly MB’s growing presence and influence in these two cities.

2.          Cohesion & Control

Since IO reflects MB’s situation to the extent that some observers describe MB and IO as two sides of the same coin, IO is clearly affected by the crises MB is experiencing, especially that IO leaders are part of MB leadership. Therefore, any division within MB is considered a split within IO itself, a fact that directly affects its cohesion and unity.

In this regard, MB have experienced internal disagreements in recent years, which escalated into a row between Ibrahim Mounir and Mahmoud Hussein over who should lead the group. The row is described by the media as a dispute between the London Front and Istanbul Front. Some figures, such as Youssef Nada, the international political foreign emissary in charge of MB’s investments in many countries, along with Mahmoud Al-Ebiary and Muhammad Al-Beheiri supported Ibrahim Mounir, while others backed Mahmoud Hussein. Mustafa Tolba, an IO member, was appointed by Mahmoud Hussein’s front as head of the steering committee in charge of MB Supreme Guide affairs, after the dismissal of Ibrahim Mounir in December 2021. He is also the deputy head of MB Shura Council (Consultative Council) in Turkey and enjoys close relations with the Turkish authorities, in addition to managing a huge range of MB investments and funds. These incidents led many observers to point to divisions within the International Organization6.

This tendency has caused IO’s Cohesion sub-indicator to be relegated to the fourth place, with a 25% impact on IO power main indicator. It is obvious that the divisions within the mother group have direct repercussions on IO and its ability to maintain unity and cohesion, especially since such divisions clearly disclose the fact that differences between MB leaders are nothing but a conflict of interests among them. The exchange of accusations between the two clans on financial and administrative corruption, which led members to lose faith in their leaders, confirms this presumption. These conflicts and accusations have contributed to undermining IO image.

Notwithstanding these setbacks, IO has worked hard not to succumb to the crises generated by the struggle for MB leadership. IO took some steps to show it is still present on the ground by promoting the role of some of its organizations, namely IUMS. For example, Ahmed Al-Raissouni, IUMS President and Sheikh Ali Al-Qara-Daghi, IUMS Secretary-General sent a cable to members expressing their happiness about the GCC reconciliation which “put an end to a dispute between brothers.”7.

3.          Structure, Composition and Centralization of Decision-Making

The Structure, Composition and Centralization of Decision-Making ranks first among the sub-indicators that make up the IO power main indicator, with a share of 40%.

In 2021, IO demonstrated a keenness to continue its coordination with MB branches, despite the state of estrangement between the two sides. It also sought to take decisions in favor of MB as a whole. For instance, the position of MB Gulf branches with respect to the events in Gaza demonstrates a high probability that IO would coordinate and take a unified position, despite the announcement by some, such as MB Bahrain to disavow the International Organization8.

Other IO efforts reflected its intention to highlight unity of the central leadership, such as its endeavor to engage in issues of concern to the Muslim world on behalf of MB and its branches. Another example is the expression of gratitude sent by IUMS on March 13, 2021, to Imran Khan, then Pakistan’s prime minister, for his efforts to support Muslim minorities and vulnerable peoples9.

4.          Supporting Lobby

The most prominent tasks taken by IO are to build a network of relations for MB with governments, decision-makers and CSOs in various countries, especially Western ones, which calls for creating lobbies. However, it is remarkable that the Supporting Lobby sub-indicator came in second place among the sub-indicators that make up IO power main indicator, with a contribution of 35%.

This position may be justified by some facts, such as the decision of the Arab Quartet (Egypt, UAE, KSA and Bahrain) in 2017, to designate MB as a terrorist organization. Also, several European countries set restrictions on some MB activities on their territories, such as the decision of the Austrian parliament, in July 2021, banning MB activities within the country and preventing them from political activities. This decision was taken as part Austria’s counterterrorism measures. In fact, Austria passed a new law which gives the state more power in restricting the activities of groups designated as terrorist organizations. Thus, Austria is the first European country to ban the Muslim Brotherhood10, a decision which left many lobbies concerned about their efforts to push for MB and IO. MB’s decreasing funding sources during the past years may also help explain the volte-face of these lobbies, which need for strong and sustained funding to maintain bonds with their clients.

On the other hand, the increase in this sub-indicator is due to IO’s efforts to create new lobbies, especially in the US. For example, IO continues to build various and multi-task MB-affiliated entities to ensure a solid base among the Muslim communities in the US. These entities would thus take advantage of their presence within such communities to influence and bet on successive US administrations. In addition, there are attempts to push some MB-affiliated figures into governments and decision-making circles. This has been greatly facilitated by the political context in the US, which is essentially based on a lobbying system.

5.          Acceptance within Society

Acceptance within Society was included as part of the set of sub-indicators that make up Societal Power main indicator, given its importance in assessing MB power within the societies they operate in. The measure of societal power is based on the positive or negative perception that the MB enjoy among the public opinion in the surveyed countries.

Conclusion

As shown in Figure 1, the sub-indicator of Structure, Composition and Centralization of Decision-Making ranked first among the sub-indicators influencing IO power’s main indicator. In second place is the Supporting Lobby sub-indicator; followed by Legitimacy, then Cohesion. Lastly is the Acceptance within Society sub-indicator.

In general, we can detect the persistence of an unfavorable context for IO activities, which is an important consideration in its power decline. In fact, a weakening IO contributed to a 12.2% decline in MB’s total power decline over the past year.

It seems that MB continue to reap the fruits of their IO activity, which offer MB a backdoor to expand within societies, especially Western ones, defend their interests and ideas and consolidate their external influence. Hence, MB had to develop an unconventional structure for their International Organization, setting a clear hierarchy governed by a set of intellectual frameworks that guide its movements and decisions. In fact, creating a shadow organization, without clarifying its mission and intellectual foundations, gives it a wide margin of maneuver, and spares it from security and political restrictions. IO looks like a thief operating under the cover of darkness. Hence IO help in coordinating between the MB and their branches, federate positions on various issues, and show the world the image of a unified and strong entity. As such, IO help maximize MB’s power and their capacity to mobilize support for their different causes and strengthen their position on the international stage.

Nevertheless, IO was not able to impose its control over the various MB branches, as its decisions are not binding to them. Moreover, there is a widespread belief among those branches that IO is here to impose Egyptian leaders over them, in a way that serves the interests of the mother Group. This situation weakened IO’s authority to exert control over these branches, especially since many of them have criticized IO’s interference in the internal conflict within Egypt’s MB. They fear being classified as terrorist entities and suffer restrictions that would affect their activities and diminish their popularity and presence in their areas of influence.

In addition, the results of last year’s report reflect IO’s inability to regain the level of effectiveness attained before and during the Arab Spring. Despite IO’s repeated attempts over the past years to strengthen its role, whether among the different MB branches or in the international arena, these efforts remain unsuccessful. In fact, this regression is a result of IO’s inability to act effectively during the past years. It is also due to the restrictions imposed on MB’s activities in some countries, as well as the internal schisms that hit the main MB group. Moreover, resorting to violence and inciting aggressive behavior have greatly affected MB’s image.

These results also show that IO power has been affected by counterterrorism efforts of Arab countries, especially the UAE, Egypt, KSA and Bahrain, which significantly curtailed MB’s tactics and dwindled their funding sources. Subsequently, IO’s capacity has regressed, since its power is strongly intersected with MB.

The decline of IO can be attributed to the general state of decline among MB branches. Although IO draws the bulk of its power from MB Egypt, it also derives a considerable amount of power from other MB branches, especially since IP claims to be the proxy that reflects the views of MB and its branches all over the world. However, the decline is observed in all branches, not only because of the internal schisms that have recently hit the branches, but also because of the political regression they have been exposed to. Thus, Tunisia’s Ennahda declined considerably after Kaïs Saïed was elected. Sudan’s MB were removed from power following the fall of Al-Bashir’s regime. Morocco’s PJD suffered a severe electoral defeat. Mauritania’s Tawâṣol Party is facing political marginalization. MB in Syria and Iraq are in seemingly permanent organizational and political decline. Even Kuwait’s MB have not regained their former influence.

New realities led MB’s International Organization to lose a lot of its power, and to question its position as a major political force in the Arab region, an image that IO has always been keen to instill in the eyes of a Western audience.  since it sought to appear to Western countries as the manifestation of the Muslim Brotherhood, representing the dominant political power in the Arab region. Moreover, restrictions on the activities of Brotherhood groups by European countries on their territories, including Brotherhood affiliated institutions, also delivered a strong blow to the Organization, given that it considers these countries to be areas of vital influence for it, not least because the freedom of movement in European countries compensated for the restrictions imposed on it in Arab countries.

The results of the International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood’s power indicator for the year 2022 clearly did reveal a decline, even in comparison with the year 2021, despite the Organization’s efforts to diversify its activities out of a fear of collapse or even total disintegration. The causes of this decline are as follows:

·      Divisions have affected the most important international Muslim Brotherhood’s organizations. For instance, the Algerian Muslim Scholars Association announced that it will be freezing its activities related the International Union of Muslim Scholars, in response to statements made against Algeria in August 2022 by Ahmed Raissouni, the head of the Moroccan Movement of Unity and Reform, in which he proclaimed that: “Moroccans, and scholars and preachers in Morocco are ready for jihad, with money and lives […] and to crawl in millions towards the Algerian city of Tindouf.” These proclamations ultimately led to Raissouni’s resignation from his IUMS position in late August 2022.

·      Solid indicators confirming the removal of MB, to a large extent, from international relations. This repudiation was not just due to MB’s declining influence on the ground, but fundamentally to their exclusion as a geostrategic instrument in inter-state conflicts: US President Joe Biden and Nancy Pelosi’s recent visit to Egypt, and their meeting with Presidents El-Sisi and Erdogan in November 2022, are a few examples.

·      The loss of influential IO leaders. Undoubtedly, the death of Al-Qaradawi and Mounir, at the end of the year 2022 further weakened MB and diminished their remaining influence given the difficulty of replacing such influential people in the short and medium term, especially within the context in which MB are currently in.

To recapitulate, as per Figure 1, it appears that the Structure, Composition, and Centralization of Decision-Making sub-indicator ranked first, affecting IO’s power main indicator. The Supporting Lobby sub-indicator came in second. The Legitimacy and Cohesion sub-indicator were placed third and fourth respectively. Finally, the Acceptance within Society sub-indicator was ranked fifth.

On the other hand, we can note the persistence of the same context that affects the progress of IO’s activities. This unfavorable context has constituted an important factor in the decline of IO power and has led to a continued decline in its contribution to MB’s total power (12.2%).

Yet, it is remarkable that IO’s share of the Muslim Brotherhood’s power increased compared to the previous year (4.7%). However, this is not really an increase in IO power, but rather a natural consequence of the decrease in other sub-indicators. In fact, MB’s political power decreased from 67.7% last year to 47.5% this year. Likewise, their economic power dropped from 66.6% to 60.4%; media power from 89.2% to 46.6%; and societal power from 77.5% to 61. 8%.

1- “Ummah” is an Arabic word that means a community of believers. In Islam, Ummah refers to the whole Muslim world. All members, the believers, are united by a very special bond, the religion of Islam, that resembles the ties that bind a close family. Muslims are brothers and sisters to one another in the Islamic community. In the context of pan-Islamism and politics, Muslims are also bound together with a common purpose, to worship Allah and with a common goal, to advance the cause of Islam [Translator’s note].