It is little known in Europe. Yet this force in charge of external operations for the Revolutionary Guards Corps – the Iranian regime’s paramilitary militia – is behind most of the terrorist attacks commissioned by the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is also at work in the Red Sea and the Straits of Hormuz, where its drones attack tankers and international commercial vessels. In the space of thirty years, it has woven a network of spies that operate even in European capitals, which it threatens more than ever. Here’s how it works.

To understand what the Al-Quds Force is, we need to go back to the origins of the Islamic Revolution and the creation of the Revolutionary Guard Corps. It was conceived at the end of 1978 under the name of People’s Army by Mohsen Sazegara, one of Khomeini’s close associates, during his exile in Paris. It was only after the return of the Ayatollah to Iran that the entity became official and took the Persian name of Pasdaran-e Enghelâb-e Eslâmi. Formed as an ideological and paramilitary militia, it made extreme violence its trademark, multiplying arbitrary arrests, torture and rape in prisons, and targeted assassinations both inside and outside the country.

Between 1981 and 1988, when Iran and Iraq were at war, the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution and members of their civilian militia, the Basij, distinguished themselves on the battlefield. Tens of thousands of them, including children as young as ten, fell as “martyrs of the Revolution” under the enemy’s shells and tanks.

During this period, veterans returning from the front benefited from zero-interest loans set up by Iranian banks as a thank-you for their good and loyal service. It was an unexpected jackpot for these glorified veterans, enabling them to invest at little risk in reconstruction programmes and various juicy businesses, and then to take control of the Iranian economy. Armed with their accumulated fortunes, they then invested in a variety of trafficking activities, notably drugs and arms, with links to their proxies in the Middle East.

It was not until 1990 that the regime agreed to the creation of the al-Quds Force, the Arabic name for Jerusalem. This Force will be in charge of the external operations of the Revolutionary Guards Corps and the protection of Iran’s borders, enabling it to control the land, sea and air routes needed to transport the proceeds of its trafficking.

With between 10,000 and 15,000 men, al-Quds has been led since 2020 by General Ismael Qaani, aged 66. He is one of the toughest figures in the Revolutionary Guards Corps, close to Rida Safi al-Din, head of Hezbollah’s Executive Council and generally regarded as the “number two” in charge of supervising the Lebanese Shiite militia’s arms trafficking and terrorist operations.

Acting almost autonomously, answering only to the orders of the Leader, the al-Quds Force command has woven its web all over the world, including in America and Europe, where it has set up a network of agents and spies.

It was behind the murder of the Shah’s former Prime Minister, Chapour Bakhtiar, in 1991, when his throat was cut at his home in the Paris suburbs. It is also suspected of attempting to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States in October 2011. She has also helped to eliminate numerous opponents of the Islamic Republic in Turkey, Pakistan and Austria. For almost a year now, it has been seeking to target some of them in England and France.

Understanding how Al-Quds works is not easy. The unit works autonomously and almost secretly, using all the conventional and non-conventional means at its disposal. It has a Board of Commanders and is officially subdivided into eight branches. It operates in the fields of intelligence – in cooperation with the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence – sabotage operations, financial operations and political influence, economic warfare, terrorism and cyber-crime. What makes it special is that its objectives, like its structure, are constantly evolving in line with the strategic interests of the Islamic Republic.

Finally, far from being a simple auxiliary force, in recent years it has acquired a very high level of expertise in the manipulation of information, inspired by the techniques of Russian foreign intelligence.

Asymmetric warfare, espionage and terrorism

Whether in Lebanon, Syria or Yemen, asymmetric warfare and guerrilla operations are the hallmark of the al-Quds Force. Currently, one of its main missions is to disrupt shipping and world trade in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, in other words to wage economic war on the West, while putting pressure on the Arab countries of the Gulf. In so doing, the minions of the Islamic Republic of Iran intend to force the latter to put pressure on the West to force Israel to halt its operations in Gaza.

For the Mullahs, it is also a way of showing the Gulf States that they are the most powerful force in the Middle East.

According to several sources we interviewed in intelligence circles, but also within the Iranian regime, Tehran also fears Western maritime power, which explains the hyperactivity of the al-Quds Force in the waters of the region.

The al-Quds Force has also set up an entire network of spies in Europe. This operates via Iranian embassies on the Old Continent, but also via intermediaries within the Shiite diaspora and transport companies. The mission of these agents is to produce intelligence on opponents of the regime, but also to exert influence and help finance Islamist organisations.

An Iranian source, formerly close to the Iranian regime, had already told us in October about the al-Quds Force’s links with the jihadist nebula: “There are (terrorist) cells in France and the United States (…). Given the large number of Muslims and the active presence of the Iranian regime in your country, they are waiting for orders from Tehran, which wants to put pressure on the West to save Hamas, show its determination and give hope to its other proxies”.

The “threat is taken very seriously”, a source close to French intelligence told us. And with good reason: according to former DEA special agent Amir Hamidi, a specialist in the Revolutionary Guards, “the al-Quds Force is also training al-Qaeda fighters inside Iran”.

A structural weakness

In recent weeks, however, the al-Quds Force has reported structural weaknesses. The Islamic Republic is short of cash and facing an unprecedented economic crisis, which is reportedly hampering a number of its military projects.

According to several sources, it is also beset by internal dissension, which seems to be disrupting decision-making by its leadership. The death of several of its officers, killed by Israel in Syria (the most recent being Mohammad Reza Zahedi, who died in an Israeli raid on an Iranian consular annex in Damascus on1 April), is also a cause for concern for the Iranian regime, which has to replace them and rebuild their networks, a long and costly process.

In addition, at least four of the middle-ranking officers of the al-Quds Force, who are critical of the regime’s strategy, were arrested at the beginning of March. This is a strong sign that the Islamic Republic, though more aggressive than ever, is really in the grip of a deep crisis at the very heart of its institutions.