Luis Martinez is an eminent politician specialising in the Maghreb and the Middle East. He has been Director of Research at Sciences Po-CERI since 2005. A visiting professor at Columbia University in New York (2000-2001) and then in Montreal (2007-2008), he was an observer for the European Union in sub-Saharan Africa. He is the author of several books, including “L’Afrique du Nord après les révoltes arabes” (Les Presses de Science Po, 2019) and “L’Afrique, le prochain califat? La spectaculaires expansion du djihadisme” (Tallandier, 2023). Interview.

– In 2023 you published “Afrique, le prochain califat?”. The title is more of a question than a statement. In your opinion, are terrorist groups in the Sahel region really on the rise, are their activities stagnating or is the threat diminishing?

– Luis Martinez: During the 2010s, the growth of jihadist groups in the Sahel was spectacular. In 2024, they are active not only in the Sahel, but also in the Gulf of Guinea and the Lake Chad basin. The threat continues to grow, as evidenced by the sense of insecurity felt by a large proportion of the population. In Burkina Faso, half the territory is under jihadist influence, and the same is true of Mali.

– The Sahel region has become a hotbed of resurgent conflict and instability. Jihadist groups are sowing chaos and terror in several countries. Is the strength of these groups linked to the extreme poverty of the populations, a breeding ground for easy recruitment, or are the causes more complex?

– There are many reasons for this. First and foremost, they denounce the injustice that affects civilian populations, and they have a remarkable ability to adapt to their environment. Bolstered by the failures of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, jihadist groups in Africa are investing in rural or coastal regions far from capital cities (the islands of Lake Chad, the forests, etc.) and are taking on board the criticisms of local populations against governments described as unjust and corrupt. Moreover, jihadist groups exploit the feeling of abandonment and relegation of discriminated communities (Touaregs, Kanouri, Peuls, etc.) who find in the jihadist insurrection an instrument capable of overturning the post-colonial political and economic order favoured by urban elites indifferent to their fate. In effect, jihadist groups aspire, over the long term, to replace the post-colonial state and political institutions with new political organisations based on the application of Islamic law, the Sharia, within the framework of an “Islamic state” or “Islamic emirate”.

– One of the most notorious groups operating in the Sahel is Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which emerged in the 2000s from a split in the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in Algeria. AQIM has since extended its activities beyond Algeria’s borders to include Mali, Niger and Mauritania. How do these groups manage to finance themselves? Who are their backers?

– The successful establishment of jihadist groups is the result of a combination of structural variables (poverty, poor governance, feelings of injustice) and situational variables (pre-existing armed conflicts, the activism of entrepreneurs of violence, the spread of jihadist ideology by itinerant preachers). These factors politicise conflicts – over land, ethnicity and the economy – and exacerbate the fragility of states, whose presence is sometimes only theoretical in whole swathes of the region. One of the keys to the successful expansion and consolidation of jihadist groups is their ability to provide young recruits with income and instil in them a sense of power by enlisting in the organisation. Joining the groups not only enhances one’s social status, but also provides a salary. However, young fighters become involved in an enterprise that goes beyond the reasons for their commitment. It’s a low-cost jihad, where jihadists exploit local resources (cattle, gold, fishing in the Lake Chad basin, timber trafficking, etc.). There are no donors; instead, the Gulf States finance the Salafists and Wahhabis.

– Another major group is Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), formed in 2017 from the merger of several militant groups in Mali, including Ansar Dine, Al-Mourabitoun and the Macina Liberation Front. JNIM has claimed responsibility for several attacks on UN peacekeepers and Malian armed forces, as well as kidnapping foreign nationals in the region. How do these groups “live together”? Do they share the same vision for the region?

– They are fighting the same enemies (France, Russia, the regimes). They have common objectives (Islamic State, Islamic Emirate or imposition of Sharia law), but their strategies are very different. ISIS is more radical theologically and more violent socially. The two sometimes clash over control of territories or populations, but in the end they often coexist. Finally, their fighters circulate and move from one group to another.

– The fight against terrorism in the Sahel is a challenge for the major Western nations and for African countries. What would be the appropriate global approach to tackle the root causes of terrorism and strengthen the capacity of Sahelian states to fight these groups?

– A purely military response does not work, as Operation Barkhane has shown. What is needed is a political response (developing federal states to leave the management of civil society to local authorities), encouraging dialogue and negotiation. Incorporate some of the demands of Islamic associations so that they support the authorities against the jihadists and above all annihilate their deadly ideology. Of course, it is essential to lift people out of poverty by adopting fairer and more dynamic economic and social policies. Like all young people around the world, the young people of the Sahel aspire to live life to the full, but their daily lives are particularly difficult and their future prospects very bleak…